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In his classic study The Functions of the Executive (1938) Chester Barnard identified 
decision making as one of the four key features of organizations.1 Later luminaries of 
management similarly locate decision making at the core of management (Simon, 
1957). Indeed, it has been proposed as possibly the most important of all managerial 
activities (Mintzberg, 1989). It might therefore be expected that the ethical and 
political basis for decision making – as contrasted with the ethics and politics of 
decision making – would have received some extensive consideration in the literature 
on management and organisations. To the contrary, writers who focus on ethics are 
                                                 
1 The others were: specialization, incentives and authority. 
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typically concerned to identify normative perspectives, or benchmarks, that can 
provide guidance for action (by managers, other stakeholders etc.) in situations of 
uncertainty. Consideration of politics (power and contestation in socially constructed 
environments) is avoided as it risks introducing a contingent and relativist dimension 
that would destabilise the seemingly universal normativity upon which an appeal to an 
‘ethics’ benchmark relies (codes of ethics exemplify this logic). In contrast, for those 
who are attentive to the politics of organisational decision making, talk of ethics is 
largely avoided as it risks introducing a dubious normativity that diverts attention 
from the primacy ascribed to power in the formation of decisions and decision 
contexts. In sum, theorisation of decision making in organizations lacks a perspective 
in which the interplay of the ethical and the political is placed at the centre. 
 
A concern to develop an alternative to this entrenched approach has inter alia 
motivated the production of a post-foundational genre of post-structural political 
philosophy. This emergent stream of work is informed, for example, by Foucault’s 
refusal to presume that (a non-contingent) truth, as a universal benchmark of ethical 
behaviour, can be disembedded from relations of power (Foucault, 1986) and/or by 
Derrida’s insistence that the structure and meaning of any social order – and therefore 
also of our identities as individuals (our sense of ‘self’) within that order - are forged 
in a confrontation with radical undecidability that gives form to both ethics and 
politics.  
 
In the following sections, we consider briefly the development of the field of 
organizational decision making (ODM) literature focussing first on how Dewey’s 
classical ‘stages’ model of rational decision making has been taken up in mainstream 
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ethical decision making (EDM) studies in a way that, by marginalising the political, 
reduces the undecidable, self-problematising ethical to the merely instrumental, self-
justifying moral. We then consider developments in ODM theory where attempts to 
deal with the limits of the classical stages model have led to a focus on power games. 
These approaches are ultimately revealed as implying understandings of the political 
that, at their limits, rely on moral perspectives whose formation (in ethicality) cannot 
be explained. We then outline a post-foundational ontology that identifies decision 
making as a confrontation with, and contingent resolution of, undecidability. This 
locates the ethical and the political in a radical ethico-political moment (or stream of 
moments) that is held to underpin both the construction of any social order and its 
attendant truths (as evidenced in its morality and power games, for example). This 
ontology has significant implications for understanding the relationship between 
ethics, politics and self-identity. To illustrate the point we explore the history of Dr 
Daniel Ellsberg’s leaking of the Pentagon Papers, an act not only with significant 
ethical and political implications (including accelerating the end of the Vietnam War 
and, indirectly, the impeachment of President Nixon) but one that is also bound up 
with significant challenges and adjustments to Ellsberg’s self-identity. Post-
foundational analysis brings the moment of decision into sharp focus but says little 
about how individuals confront and survive this moment (or to put it more prosaically, 
if as Kierkegaard says the decision is a moment of madness, how is it that most 
decision makers are not found to be mad?). When considering the Ellsberg case, we 
draw primarily on Laclau’s post-foundational analysis of the ethics and politics of the 
decision. Identifying a silence, or oversight, in Laclau’s analysis we then turn briefly 
to two other post-structuralist authors – Levinas and Critchley - to explore the role of 
emotional investment in processes of decision-making and identification. So doing, 
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we contribute to a rarely explored aspect of the post-structural challenge to the 
autonomous, self-contained subject and point to friendship, as ‘the other’ of 
‘cronyism’, as a facilitator of the passage through undecidability which we take to be 
the hallmark of ethical decision making. 
 
2 Classical decision making models and Ethical Decision Making (EDM) 
The dominant conceptions of organizational decision-making are all derived from an 
idealised model that sees decision-making as a rational, mechanical and algorithmic 
process (Clegg et al., 2007) consistent with modern management ideas, such as those 
of Taylor (1967/1911) and Fayol (1949). In the modern period, this idealised, or 
classical, decision making model can be traced back to Dewey’s (1910) identification 
of five consecutive stages in the decision-making process starting with (1) recognition 
of an issue requiring a decision and then proceeding by (2) defining the issue, (3) 
identifying solutions, (4) evaluating solutions and finally (5) implementing the 
preferred solution.  
 
A variant of this stages model is evident in the more politically-focused variants of 
organizational decision making (ODM) theory advanced by Herbert Simon (1959) 
and his associates where the model has been extensively and creatively reworked 
(through the concepts of satisficing, bounded rationality etc., discussed later) without 
disrupting its basic, or founding, logic (Clegg et al., 2007). In the subfield of ethical 
decision making (EDM), the classical/idealised stages model continues to be highly 
influential. For example, recent studies (Calabretta et al., 2011; Albrecht et al., 2010; 
Ma, 2009) identify the four most highly cited studies in the field of business ethics as 
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relating to EDM, and all these studies (Jones, 1991; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Trevino, 
1986; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985) rely on the classical model. 
 
Summarising the distinctive elements of the dominant EDM model, Jones asserts that: 
“Human decision-making processes are often activated by the presence of a 
problem that requires a solution or response and often some form of action 
(Bazerman, 1986). Moral decision making is no exception; the process begins 
with a problem, which includes a moral component. … For the moral 
decision-making process to begin, a person must be able to recognize the 
moral issue.” (1991, 380) 
 
In this dominant EDM model, moral issues are conceived as emergent from the social, 
cultural, economic and organizational environment in which decision-makers are 
embedded. But the model offers minimal illumination of what is involved in the 
process of emergence (and recognition), and in how this process relates to the 
formation of individual identities and subjectivities (including the individual’s values 
and ‘moral cognitions’). What occurs in making (or constructing) a decision is 
effectively ‘black boxed’ – that is, unexamined and so under-theorized, with regard, 
for example, to social interaction (with its attendant issues of politics and power 
games) and the formation of judgements, intentions and actual behaviours. 
Ultimately, ‘ethical decision making’ becomes largely confined to taking moral 
decisions (decisions and calculations about what counts as good or right in situations 
where a range of actions are possible and must be chosen between), while genuine 
ethical dilemmas (having to make a decision and act in a situation where it is 
impossible ever to calculate or decide what is the right thing to do) are disregarded or 
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overlooked, perhaps because their elimination by an adequately refined EDM model 
is assumed. The undecidability of the ethical can become so conflated with the 
uncertainty of the moral that it then seems unproblematical to say, in EDM literature, 
that “the terms moral judgment and ethical decision making [can be] used 
synonymously.” (Trevino, 1986, 604).  
 
More recently, proponents of a constructionist approach to EDM have begun to 
recognise and attend to the political nature of decision making. For example, the 
presumption that a moral dilemma can be positively identified has been challenged by 
views that “foreground the ability of individuals and groups to interpret situations and 
problems differently” (Martin and Parmar, 2012, 294). Crossan et al. (2013) explicitly 
recognise the political nature of the decision making process, but in doing so they 
reaffirm a commitment to the classical model where the moralising individual’s “self-
reflection on previous experiences can…serve as a buffer against the strong pressures 
of external situations to act against one’s virtuous core” (Crossan et al., 2013, 576). 
Other approaches pay more attention to the intuitive and non-conscious processes of 
sensemaking that underpin decision making (Hunter, 2012). Here, a confrontation 
with ambiguity is more clearly recognised as the context of decision making; issue 
construction is conceived to reflect individuals’ expectations and motivations; and in 
decision making, it is considered that “individuals first use intuitions and then use 
post hoc (moral) reasoning” (Sonenshein, 2007, 1027). In such work, there is some 
recognition that “the very idea of sensemaking collapses distinctions between 
cognition and action (Weick, 1979), making clear bifurcations among stages difficult” 
(Sonenshein, 2007, 1035). But in resorting to ‘post-hoc reasoning’, such analysis 
retains a commitment to the classical stages model – decisions may be made 
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intuitively but ultimately they need to have been reason-able (see also Thiel et al., 
2012). 
 
The approaches briefly reviewed in this section are indebted to the classical stages 
model and hence to the tendency to reduce the ethical (as a crisis in confrontation 
with the undecidable) to the moral (as a more or less reasonable decision among, 
possibly ambiguous, options). Largely unexplored are alternative philosophical 
orientations that would open the ‘black-boxed’ stages of EDM by considering how, 
for example, ‘power’, ‘identity’ and ‘interests’ are inextricably and continuously 
present and enacted in, and throughout, decision making. Such an opening challenges 
the inclination to evade consideration of the ‘black box’ of an intractable 
undecidability by conflating it with a potentially tractable, controllable notion of 
uncertainty. In the following section, we consider the significance of ‘power’ before 
turning to address the significance of undecidability for ethical decision making. 
 
3 Beyond the rational model: enter politics 
In contributions to the ODM literature broadly defined (which are often ignored by 
proponents of EDM), concerns about the idealism and objectivism of the rational, 
stages conception of decision making are addressed, in part, by Simon’s focus upon 
bounded rationality and satisficing. As he notes when writing about satisficing, “the 
term environment is ambiguous. We are not interested in describing some physically 
objective world in its totality … what we call the environment will depend on the 
“needs”, “drives” or “goals” of the organism” (Simon, 1956, 130). The significance, 
and dependence, of decision-making with regard to context was to become more 
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explicit in Cohen, March2 and Olsen’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ model. There decision 
making, far from being a linear rational activity, is conceived as a more random and 
even anarchic process resulting from the largely accidental coming together of 
participants, problems and solutions at choice opportunities. Readily available 
answers provide acceptable ‘fixes’, rather than being placed on hold until the solution 
to the (objectively defined) problem has been exhaustively calculated. In similar vein, 
Lindblom’s ‘science of muddling through’ emphasises how decision making in 
organisations is “a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in 
which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration” (Lindblom, 
1959, p 86), and how the frameworks with which we approach and understand 
choices are strongly path dependent and hence subjective (ibid., p 88).  
 
Notwithstanding that these approaches conceive of decision making as a contingent, 
partial and negotiated process, there is no close consideration of how, for example, the 
‘acceptability’ of a decision is determined. What Pettigrew terms “the politics of 
organizational decision making” (1973) suggests that acceptable decisions are “a 
function of the balancing of various power vectors” (Pettigrew, 1972, 202). To be 
clear, what is meant by ‘balancing’ is not the impartial identification and weighing-up 
of different options but, rather, the push and pull of different forces (or ‘power 
vectors’), with the outcome resulting from the more effective mobilization of 
resources by one party to outflank or overcome opponents. Instead of studying 
decisions as an outcome of rational, if imperfect (e.g. satisficing), processes, it is 
politics, in the form of a struggle between people with “access to varying amounts of 
resources” (Pettigrew, 1972, 202), that is placed at the centre of the decision making 
                                                 
2 March had co-authored, with Simon the influential Organizations (March and Simon, 1958). 
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process and which accounts for its outcomes. It is within political struggles that the 
elements of decision making – meanings, demands, contexts – are constructed, 
realized or frustrated.  
 
Pettigrew’s analysis of decision making as an outcome of “processes of power 
mobilization attempted by each party in support of its demand” (1972, 202) resonates 
with what Lukes (2005; 1974) identifies as the first and second dimensions of power. 
The first dimension is in play when decisions are made in situations of overt conflict 
and contestation between competing interests. The second dimension refers to the 
making, or constructing, of decisions by circumventing or suppressing issues, thereby 
preventing them from becoming foci/objects of decision-making (Lukes, 2005, 22). In 
The Politics of Decision Making, Pettigrew (1973) reports a strategic decision 
concerned with IT procurement in which there were overt conflicts between factions 
within management but he also provides instances where power was mobilised to 
suppress the articulation of any oppositional positions by ensuring that they were kept 
off the agenda. 
 
The original element in Lukes’ (1974) contribution to the study of decision making is 
his identification of a  third, more pervasive and insidious, dimension of power which 
operates to inhibit the very formation of certain preferences and associated grievances. 
It is not that such preferences are directly frustrated within, or covertly excluded from, 
processes of decision making. Rather, they never appear: 
“is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, 
to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
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existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative 
to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value 
it as divinely ordained and beneficial?” (Lukes, 2005, 28)  
 
Pivotal here is how domination relates to socialisation. If people are so thoroughly 
socialized into a social order that they accept it  and their own identity as natural or 
given, then they are (rendered) incapable of imagining alternatives and of voicing 
demands that might ‘speak’ of those alternatives. This third dimension is 
distinguished by how “compliance to domination [is secured] through the shaping of 
beliefs and desires, by imposing internal constraints under historically changing 
circumstances” (Lukes, 2005, 143-4). However, the positing of this third dimension of 
power begs the question: how can the ‘real interests’ of an individual or a group be 
disentangled from the internal constraints that represent dominant interests?  
 
It is at this point that analysis in which the focus is upon dimensions of power in 
decision making approaches its limits. The difficulty for Lukes’ formulation of the 
third dimension of power lies in the assumption that beliefs and desires can be shaped 
in ways that secure compliance to domination. In making this assumption, his analysis 
slides towards social determinism where, in effect, there are no decisions. Why not? 
Because, following Lukes’ formulation of the third dimension of power, choices, 
ethical or otherwise, are illusory as they are very strongly conditioned, if not 
determined, by social imperatives including those of morality (i.e. moral imperatives). 
The scope for ethics is vanishingly reduced as choices are all (pre)determined by the 
meanings presented to, and imprinted upon, us by society.  
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4 Post-foundationalism and the ethico-political moment 
So far, we have suggested that EDM theory effectively marginalises the political 
while the focus upon politics in ODM theory is at the expense of ethics. The inability 
to theorise at the same time both the ethical and the political, we have suggested, is 
associated with the limitations of the rational stages model to which EDM and ODM 
are indebted.  
 
To avoid the separation of ethics and politics, we commend a turn to a post-structural 
approach where undecidability (rather than mere uncertainty) is placed at the centre of 
ontology. Specifically, we engage and commend Laclau’s thinking which turns away 
from conceiving of social reality (e.g. ‘interests’, ‘morality’, ‘structures’, ‘power’ etc.) 
as the pre-existing objective ground of decision making. Instead, decision-making is 
understood as a series of moments of ethico-political articulation that retroactively 
invoke, and hence objectify, the social reality they aspire to represent (see Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001, xi). In the decisive act, social reality is instantiated, made present 
(presented) and represented. The force or power of this representation derives from its 
success in presenting the variant of social reality that it enacts and objectifies as if it 
was already there (hence the term retro-active). To be clear, this approach does not 
fall victim to the (idealist) position that reality is equivalent to representations of it. 
To the contrary, it recalls that representations never capture the reality that they seek 
to disclose but that, nonetheless, they retroactively invoke and objectify it. 
 
This perspective places decision making at the very centre of the continuous 
reconstruction of social reality. Through processes of identification and objectification 
- with regard to established moral imperatives, for example - subjects repeatedly 
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confront and precariously prevail over an inherent openness and associated 
undecidability in social reality. In these processes, social reality is invoked and 
instantiated retroactively in a way that suggests that it was already there but is now 
disclosed (see Dyrberg, 1997, 16). In Foucauldian terms, these are continuous, 
contextualised processes of subjectivation as well as objectification. As Skinner 
(2013, 916) has characterised this process: 
“Subjectivation occurs through the subject locating her/himself within a field 
of commonly accepted moral conduct, as a subject of that moral conduct, 
whilst objectivation occurs concurrently through assessing one’s performance 
as an ethical subject in the light of one’s actions through “self-reflection, self-
knowledge, self-examination” (Foucault, 1984, 29)” 
 
What Skinner terms subjectivation-objectivation involves, we contend, a continuous 
process of decision making “exercised by every individual on a daily basis…The only 
prerequisites are to be capable of thinking and acting” (Skinner, 2013, 918). Each of 
us is continuously engaging, less or more consciously and deliberately, with the 
contingency (undecidability) of the social world that demands the making of 
decisions. Subjectivation is not socially determined or automatic, even when it 
becomes routinised and unreflective. Its outcome is objectivation, and social reality is 
thereby retroactively instantiated.   
 
In this formulation, social realities with which we identify as subjects are retroactively 
instantiated (given meaningful form or objectivity) through and out of the continuous 
stream of decisions that we each make every day. They are never closed or totalised. 
Closure would imply that meanings (the sense and significance we make of the world 
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and of ourselves as subjects of/in that world) are immutable. It would imply that every 
ethical dilemma could ultimately be reduced to an algorithmic moral calculation and 
the political would become merely the working through of structural determinism. As 
we have seen, the classical stages model, by disregarding (or occluding) the disruptive 
and dislocatory effects of undecidability, leads either to the reduction of the ethical to 
the moral or of the political to determinism. Implicitly the stages model presumes the 
possibility of closure and, in doing so, it excludes any possibility of recognising, and 
attending to, the space of undecidability in social reality that is the condition of 
possibility of decision making. 
 
The very idea of a decision, and we might add of human freedom, presumes that 
things are not predetermined: they can be different, they can change and can become 
otherwise. This implies that social reality is open to reinterpretation and alternative 
invocations. The relationship between decision making and the openness of social 
reality is explored extensively by Ernesto Laclau in an approach which is indebted to 
Derrida’s insights into deconstruction. A central insight of deconstruction is that, in an 
open system, the formation of any meaningful order (such as language or social 
reality) relies on the occlusion of undecidability. This occlusion is necessary to create 
the semblance of stability and continuity in the meaning(s), or sense, of the system. 
Making the world meaningful (as occurs for example in Skinner’s subjectivation-
objectivation process) entails a stabilisation (or sedimentation) of meanings that relies 
upon the occlusion of undecidability. But because undecidability can never be 
removed from the system, every meaning is vulnerable to deconstruction that, in turn, 
exposes (reactivates) the undecidability within it. 
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This understanding, developed within a post-foundational genre of post-structuralism, 
identifies undecidability as both the necessary condition of possibility of any social 
order and the locus of the decision. To expand briefly: for Laclau, “Undecidability 
should be literally taken as that condition from which no course of action necessarily 
follows.” (1996, 78) The moment(s) of decision become(s) necessary and constitutive 
as social order. Social relations are instantiated and sedimented (and so become 
accepted as ‘normal’) through an occlusion of undecidability that they produce (or 
perform) but which they can never completely conceal (as to do so would be to effect 
closure which is impossible). It is by exposing the inescapable presence of 
undecidability that deconstruction “reactivate[s] the moment of decision that 
underlies any sedimented set of social relations” (Laclau, 1996, 78 original emphasis). 
“The political and ethical significance of this”, Laclau continues, “is that by enlarging 
the area of structural undecidability it enlarges also the area of responsibility - that is, 
of the decision.” (Laclau, 1996, 78 emphasis added) This makes it possible, and 
necessary, to reclaim the ethical from its unhelpful conflation with the moral, and also 
to locate undecidability at the centre of decision making as an ethical and political 
moment. That said, it is necessary for any decision to go through ‘the ordeal of the 
undecidable’ (Derrida, 1992, 24) if it is to count as an ethical decision, rather than a 
calculation or a habitual response. 
 
We are now in a better position to expand upon a distinction to which we alluded 
earlier. We understand ‘being ethical’ as a process (or stream of moments) in which, 
by “going through the ordeal of the undecidable” (Derrida, 1992, 24), the individual 
“‘invents’ him/herself as an ethical subject through the practice of making decisions 
beyond rules” (Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013, 471). Morality, by contrast, is (for us) 
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the application of a particular ethico-political stance. Typically, the morality, or the 
moral orientation, adopted is itself embedded in the dominant social order. It 
approximates to, and may be idealized as, a set of seemingly natural and/or universal 
principles but it is inescapably coloured by its historical situatedness. Ethics, in 
contrast, is associated with the suspension of such recourse to a pre-existing moral 
orientation. When framed in this way, the decision is conceived as a commitment to, 
or identification with, a system of meanings that come into being with the decision 
(that is, retroactively). Of course, the decision takes place in an historically and 
culturally distinctive context (Clegg et al., 2007). But it is inescapably a confrontation 
with undecidability at the limits of that context: 
“the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency 
and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effect of this 
theoretical or historical moment, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it 
always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive 
deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it. The instance of the decision 
is a madness, says Kierkegaard.” (Derrida, 1992, 26 original emphasis) 
 
Returning to our opening reference to Barnard, decision making is perhaps not just 
one of (four) key features of the (re)production of organization through processes of 
organizing but is the key feature. Even when routinized and rationalized, every 
decision is unavoidably political and ethical. It necessarily mobilises one or more 
dimensions of power in order to privilege some form of order that inescapably 
forecloses other possibilities. The decision is always forced inasmuch that “to choose 
a course of action implies an act of coercion with respect to other possible courses of 
action.” (Laclau, 1990, 171). It is a necessary coercion as it is only through a violent 
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act of identification, in which other possibilities are forcefully excluded, that agents 
can differentiate and constitute themselves as subjects in a social order.  
 
This approach offers an alternative to more established analyses of decision making 
by avoiding the shortcomings ascribed to them. But it also faces at least two distinct, 
though related, challenges. First, it may be asked: if the decision is a moment of 
madness, then how is it relevant for understanding ‘normal’ decision making in 
organisations? Second, if the decision arises in coercion, are we condemned to 
understand decisions only as acts of power and the political? How, in the face of 
radical and un-nameable undecidability, can we understand what it means to be 
ethical?  
 
5 Deciding beyond reason: Ellsberg & the Pentagon Papers 
When examined from a post-foundational perspective, the decision is a moment of 
action where undecidability is encountered – with implications for, and impacts on, 
each agent’s identifications. As Laclau puts it,  “…if, when I decide, I am taking a 
course of action which was not predetermined, in that case the decision does not 
follow automatically from what I already was, but rather through it I am also 
constituting myself and, at the same time, repressing other possibilities open to me.” 
(Laclau, 1990, 171 emphasis added). The possibility of taking an alternative course of 
action implies that the decision is not a calculation which mobilises a pure, 
transcendental objectivity; and neither is it socially (pre)determined. As Dyrberg 
points out: “As the limit idea of decision making, rational persuasion is the point 
where the supposed highest moment of decidability is also the moment of 
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undecidability…It follows that decisions – rational persuasion included – are always 
marked by this disjunction; hence they cannot be algorithmic” (Dyrberg, 1997, 37). 
Persuasion and even consensus are, as we argued above, inescapably acts of 
‘coercion’ in the sense that they involve a measure of identification with a particular 
order and so foreclose other possibilities (Dyrberg, 1997, 38). The madness of the 
decision refers to an a-rational (non-algorithmic) instantiation of, and identification 
with, a particular order as a means of neutralising and domesticating and thereby 
occluding undecidability. It is mad because it is a commitment without the possibility 
of its justification being supported by reasoning that is external to itself. 
 
The issue, then, is not whether a decision calls prior identifications into question but 
how, and the extent to which, it does so. Where the decision sits comfortably with 
prior identifications, it will be more readily experienced as rational and reasonable, 
because it engages and affirms the agent’s established ways of occluding 
undecidability. Such a decision is unremarkable or routine, and so it may pass 
unnoticed precisely because it is not reactivated as political or ethical. On reflection, 
we can recognise how we are constantly making decisions – over what to do, what to 
say, what to write – decisions that are typically experienced as comparatively 
unproblematic, and so are rather undemanding so long as they do not call into 
question our identifications with(in) existing structural contexts. In the absence of 
reflection, we do not even recognise our engagement with, and occlusion of, 
undecidability. It is when we are prompted to reflect and/or when our identifications 
become precarious or are breached that we experience increased exposure to, and are 
forced into, a more direct confrontation with undecidability. In this moment of out-of-
jointness, previously sedimented identifications become unsettled, reactivated and 
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rearticulated in a traumatic (maddening) search for new meanings and orderings - as 
Garfinkel’s (1967) breaching experiments attest. 
 
Weiskopf and Willmott (2013) consider such a process when examining the decision 
of Dr Daniel Ellsberg, a former RAND employee, to leak the Pentagon Papers 
(hereafter the Papers) to The New York Times in 1971. This notorious act of 
whistleblowing was a catalyst for an accelerated ending of the Vietnam War and, 
indirectly, contributed to the impeachment of President Nixon. This example is taken 
up not because it was unambiguously ‘ethical’ and/or ‘political’ but, more prosaically, 
because it is well documented and forms the basis of Ellsberg’s lengthy memoir, 
Secrets. A loyal servant of the state,  brought up in a solid Jewish middle class family 
which had converted to Christian Science, Ellsberg initially identified strongly with, 
and willingly served within, an apparatus (or governmentality: Foucault, 1997) of 
secrecy. As a senior RAND consultant, he worked as an advisor at the highest levels 
of the Pentagon where he was trusted with access to state secrets. Keeping those 
secrets, Ellsberg reports, was “virtually part of one’s core identity” (Ellsberg, 2010, 
774). 
 
In Ellsberg’s account, his passage to the final act of leaking the Papers resulted from a 
growing sense of discomfort with, and questioning of how, the Pentagon presumed 
the personal loyalty of its staff and its consultants to the President. This loyalty, which 
also presumed Ellsberg’s identification with its demands, was regarded as more 
important than “obligation  to truth, to fellow Americans, and to other human lives” 
(Ellsberg, 2003, 43-4): “for the Congress, the press, and the public to know much 
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about what the president was doing for them, was at best unnecessary and irrelevant.” 
(Ellsberg, 2003, 43-4)  
 
Ellsberg’s identification was challenged by a series of events. They included: a public 
encounter with Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to the President, where 
disconcerting silences in the prevalent account of the progress of the war were 
exposed3; a realisation from reading the Papers that secret US policy on Vietnam went 
well beyond what was admitted by the Executive and, more importantly, far exceeded 
what relatively informed and sceptical outsiders, including journalists and members of 
Congress, had been led to believe or, with few exceptions, could conceivably 
imagine; personal contacts with anti-war campaigners; and finally the reaction of 
Patricia Marx, a peace activist who became Ellsberg’s wife, who, when given extracts 
of the Papers to read by him, pointed out that they used the ‘language of torturers’. 
(Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013, 477-480)  
 
In our interpretation of these events, they instigated a gradual but dislocating process 
of reactivation of Ellsberg’s prior sedimented identifications (with the morality of the 
Pentagon and with his identity as a privileged insider), leading to the ‘madness’ of the 
final, decisive moment when he determined to leak the Papers to The New York 
Times. At that point, Ellsberg forever forecloses the possibility of old identifications 
(as trusted Pentagon insider, for example), although, and crucially, the full 
ramifications of his actions were incalculable. In hindsight, Ellsberg makes sense of 
the decisive moment as experiencing a “personal sense of obligation and urgency, of 
                                                 
3 The prevalent account was that the war was trending down. However while US troop numbers were 
falling Ellsberg knew that Indochinese casualties, refugees and bombing tonnages were all trending up. 
(Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013, 477) 
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moral imperative” (Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013; Ellsberg, 2003, 257) where he 
could no longer continue to postpone making public the contents of the Papers despite 
being unable to calculate the personal consequences of such action (e.g. the uncertain 
prospect of a long prison service as well as widespread vilification).  
 
Ellsberg’s process of decision making, we contend, was not a careful calculation 
between alternatives. Instead it involved an extended process of letting go of old, 
largely routinised identifications leading (in this case) to a crisis and irrevocable act 
that forces him to find new identifications. So, for example, his developing 
identification with other anti-war activities left him feeling liberated but also “naked 
and raw” like the experience of “shedding that skin” (Ellsberg, 2003, 268).  
Subsequently, when re-inscribed as a political activist and campaigner, Ellsberg has 
commented on material published on Wikileaks.org, such as the 260,000 classified 
State Department cables released by Bradley Manning. Ellsberg’s new identifications 
have to be formed in a world disrupted by the moment of decision but they were not 
fully or algorithmically anticipated. Instead Ellsberg has had – was forced - to rebuild 
(and re-sediment) his identifications; and he has had to do it in a world changed by his 
actions, and in which that change has offered new identification possibilities and 
challenges which might have been partially anticipated or glimpsed, but not grasped 
or comprehended in advance – for example, as ‘hero’, ‘peace campaigner’, ‘traitor’, 
‘madman’ ‘wild man’, etc. 
 
But if the decision arises in undecidability then what basis is there for being ethical? 
As a moment of non-algorithmic urgent precipitation, or even madness, Ellsberg’s 
whistleblowing is clearly political, not only because it involved the mobilisation of 
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the media (New York Times and many other newspapers) to expose the Pentagon’s 
exercise of what Lukes identifies as the three dimensions of power, but also because it 
had, and continues to have political significance. Not least, it is seen as a precursor 
and justificatory point of reference to more recent leaks of state secrets by Bradley 
Manning and Edward Snowden. But what makes it also ethical?  
 
In their detailed examination of Ellsberg’s whistleblowing, Weiskopf and Willmott 
(2013) argue that his engagement in practices, including his relationship with Patricia 
Marx, opened him to ‘the other’ – notably, the Indochinese casualties and refugees 
silenced and unnamed in the dominant Pentagon discourse – which previously 
Ellsberg had regarded as unfortunate but necessary collateral damage. And that it was 
this ‘opening up’ which initiated a process of radical dis-identification with the state’s 
pursuit of the Vietnam War, resulting in Ellsberg’s fateful decision. In Ellsberg’s 
words, a process of dis-identification enabled him to find loyalties long unconsulted: 
loyalties to “our [US] constitutional system, to countrymen, to one’s humanity” 
(Ellsberg quoted in Bok, 1989, 207). In Ellsberg’s account of his whistleblowing, and 
especially in his language of ‘unconsulted loyalties’, one might discern an attempt at 
identification with an alternative discourse (or ordering of discourses). This suggests a 
possible, fumbling articulation of a new set of (perhaps largely un-nameable) 
significations that had the potential for Ellsberg to resediment his identifications 
around them.  
 
But we may also detect recourse to prior identifications rather than the madness of a 
confrontation with radical undecidability. In an in-depth, carefully researched but 
unauthorised biography, Wild Man, written by an experienced and well-respected 
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biographer (Wells, 2001), Ellsberg is depicted as a brilliant but narcissistic fantasist. 
He is portrayed as someone who expected to enjoy a glittering career but, when this 
ambition was unfulfilled, largely as a consequence of his irascible and hectoring 
nature, Ellsberg sought recognition and admiration by contriving to obtain, copy and 
then leak the Papers. Far from being a heroic individual who courageously and 
selflessly fought an unjust and unresponsive ‘system’, Wells’ account of Ellsberg 
presents a highly complex, flawed figure who pursued his dreams of social 
recognition and celebration by abusing his position of trust. It was Ellsberg’s 
“frustration over his inability to influence events, to move the levers of power, and his 
anger at the rejection of his ideas (perhaps one might say narcissistic rage)”, 
according to Wells, that “were probably pivotal to his transformation…He may have 
released the Papers partly out of ire or vengeance at those in the establishment who 
had turned their back on him” (Wells, 2001, 316, 344). 
 
When viewed this way, Ellsberg’s actions appear more like a vindictive or narcissistic 
(ab)use of power by leveraging access to the Papers for purposes of revenge and/or 
self-aggrandisement, rather than an ethical act. How then can a post-foundational 
perspective help us understand the decision as a radical moment that is ethical as well 
as political?  
 
6 Sustaining the ethical bricoleur 
To explore this question, we turn to Laclau’s post-foundational perspective in which 
the passage through a confrontation with undecidability is the moment of decision that 
retroactively instantiates some social ordering. This passage has ethical and political 
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consequences as it forecloses other, unrealised possibilities. As a consequence of 
undecidability, Laclau observes, “We live as bricoleurs in a plural world, having to 
take decisions within incomplete systems of rules (incompletion here means 
undecidability)...It is because of this constitutive incompletion that decisions have to 
be taken” (Laclau, 1996, 79 original emphasis). When interpreted from this 
perspective, Ellsberg’s moment(s) of decision to leak the Papers can be understood as 
a final break with a prior investment in a particular normative order, in the form of an 
instilled sense of patriotism, that inhibited his commitment of an act of ‘treason’. 
Clearly, his action, or actions, involving a ‘moment’ or ‘moments’ of ‘madness’, 
demonstrates that decision making is irreducible to any particular normative order. In 
Laclau’s assessment, the inescapable presence of undecidability means that our 
understandings of what it means ‘to be or do better’ are irremediably open to 
disruption, deconstruction and revision. So, whatever we take to be ‘good and right’ 
or even ‘the best’ at any point in time “is never good and right enough” (Torfing, 
1999, 282), nor could it ever be so.  
 
Laclau’s theorization of ethical bricolage focuses predominantly on its implications 
for how we confront undecidability, and thereby become: 
“ethically and politically responsible in the course of taking a decision, 
because the decision is called for by the dislocation of the structure, which 
reveals its undecidability and implies the absence of a voice of structural 
necessity speaking through the subject. The subject is forced to invent new 
solutions and make unheard-of moves in a situation in which there are no solid 
foundations to build upon.” (Torfing, 1999, 285) 
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For Laclau, dislocation of the structure – the impossibility yet necessity of achieving 
social  closure – is at the core of social existence, and it is what renders decisions, 
which produce a (precarious) sense of closure, both politically and ethically 
significant.  Decision-making is political because it (re)presents an immanent voice of 
apparent structural necessity articulated through the subject; and it is ethical because it 
(re)constructs the social world in a particular way. Ethical bricolage may be a process 
of decision-making informed by political commitments to particular values – of 
democracy, justice, etc. - and it has unintended as well as somewhat anticipated 
political consequences (e.g. ending the Vietnam War more quickly). Nevertheless, it 
requires incalculable invention in the absence of “foundations to build upon” 
(Torfing, 1999, 285). It involves “a moment of investment which is not dictated by 
the nature of its object” (Laclau, 2000, 81) – that is the ‘object’ (or partly anticipated 
objective) in which the investment is made. It involves the madness of thinking the 
unthinkable and of acting beyond calculation. 
 
Ethical bricolage implies a commitment to making decisions that hold true to the 
ultimate emptiness of our values and associated claims. This does not imply nihilism 
but, rather, an appreciation of how the ethical bricoleur holds his or her favoured 
normative framework open to question while simultaneously acknowledging and 
bearing witness to the dislocated and undecidable nature of his/her own self-identity. 
The bricoleur recognises not only the decision but also his/her own self-identity as 
inherently undecidable and deconstructable. It is a deconstructability to which 
Ellsberg speaks when commenting upon the reaction of the media following 
publication of devastating revelations from excerpts from the Papers. For any one of 
the “pillars of the Establishment”, such as the New York Times, 
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“to contemplate challenging to this degree in action that urgent judgment of 
the president and commander in chief in wartime would have been in the most 
literal sense unthinkable, before it happened…They [media commentators] 
were going through the same process I had, learning the need to think for 
themselves, to use their own judgments about what was right for them to do in 
a crisis, discovering their own readiness to risk recrimination and face heavy 
penalties when they had to.” (Ellsberg, 2003, 399 emphasis added). 
 
What we take from Laclau here is that the madness of the decision opens us to the 
inescapable presence of undecidability. Laclau’s formulation of ethical bricolage 
focuses mainly on the structural aspects of the decision. Largely ignored by Laclau is 
the question of how such a bricoleur can maintain and sustain his/her (changing) self 
through the madness of the decision.4 Ellsberg’s language of crisis, risk and fear of 
penalties points to this dimension in which the moment of decision, by retroactively 
instantiating some new and uncertain identification, challenges and undermines not 
only previously held identifications but even our sense of self (our sense of having a 
coherent continuing identity that is ‘me’). To illuminate this aspect, we consider here 
two possible approaches that have been advanced from a post-structural perspective. 
First we briefly consider Levinasian ethics and then we turn to Critchley’s 
identification of humour as the subject’s way of coping with the infinite demands of 
Levinas’s ‘other’. What these approaches share with Laclau is an attentiveness to the 
post-structural de-centred subject and its ethico-political significance. Where they 
differ is in their attention to, and their respective understandings of, how human 
                                                 
4 In what we take to be a closely related concern, Critchley has previously critiqued Laclau’s theory,  
arguing that it “requires an ethical dimension of infinite responsibility to the other if it is not going to 
risk collapsing into the arbitrariness of a thoroughgoing decisionism.” (Critchley, 2004, 116)  
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beings face and cope with this condition – in other words, how the space of the 
political, and especially the ethical, is navigated from the perspective of self and 
identification. 
 
Levinas. For Levinas, the ethical resides in how “from the start, the other affects us 
despite ourselves” (1991, 129) as an inescapable and infinite felt responsibility for 
one’s neighbour, the ‘other’. Since this responsibility is infinite (we can never reach a 
stage where we can say we have fully met all our responsibilities to others), it is 
irremediably undecidable. The impossibility of fulfilling this responsibility is 
compounded by how our experience of selfhood routinely develops into “a reflexively 
constituted sense of self-identity” that “has the effect of ‘encrusting’ the self and 
thereby blunting moral sensibility.” (Roberts, 2001, 110) This encrusted sense of self 
distances us from our infinite responsibility for the other: it renders that responsibility 
easier to bear but also harder to fulfil. The possibility of ethics requires and entails an 
erosion of this encrusted self (my sense of who ‘I’ am) as encrustation distances me 
from the other, and so diminishes my ethical sensibility: it cushions my responsibility 
for the other. A condition of ethical action is the recovery - or (re-)discovery - of an 
identity “forged in my encounter with my neighbour, which denudes me, and which is 
prior to the self consciousness that is always a recuperation of the self.” (Roberts, 
2001, 112).  
 
Critchley. Critchley’s thinking is strongly influenced by Levinas, but informed also 
by an earlier extended dialogue with Laclau (Critchley, 2004; Critchley et al., 1996), 
Critchley’s (2007) proposition is that the primacy accorded by Levinas to ethics 
implies an inescapable demand upon the subject in the face of the ‘other’. This 
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demand is too weighty to be met coherently by resorting to the prescriptions of a 
normative order with which the self routinely becomes identified, or ‘encrusted’. 
Indeed, for Critchley the demand is so excessively burdensome that it “runs the risk of 
chronically overloading – indeed masochistically persecuting - the subject with 
responsibility” (2007, 11). As he puts it: 
“…the subject is defined in terms of a division between itself and an 
exorbitant demand that it can never meet, the demand to be infinitely 
responsible. The ethical subject shapes itself in relation to a demand that splits 
it open.” (Critchley, 2007, 69) 
 
The central and pressing question, then, is how this extreme demand can “be borne 
without crushing the ethical subject” (Critchley, 2007, 69) or resulting in its 
encrustation. Rejecting any possibility of access to an authentic or undivided 
subjectivity that can transcend this condition, Critchley argues instead for an originary 
in-authenticity as “the core of subjective experience” (2007, 78), and he proposes 
humour “as a practice of minimal sublimation that both maintains and alleviates the 
division of the ethical subject.” (2007, 11) Humour, and particularly self-deprecating 
humour, he contends, “allows the subject to bear the excessive, indeed hyperbolic, 
burden of the ethical demand without that demand turning into excessive self-hatred 
and cruelty.” (Critchley, 2007, 78-9) This levity is found, for example, in the 
grandiose and hubristic efforts of a ‘split’ self that endeavours to control and restore 
itself by emulating a pre-divided status. From this perspective, the subject better 
placed to cope with the demands of infinite responsibility is the subject who has 
developed “a maturity that comes from learning to laugh at oneself, from finding 
oneself ridiculous.” (Critchley, 2007, 83) When leavened in this way, the demand of 
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infinite responsibility is no longer “paralysing the ego”. Instead, the “experience of an 
unattainable future, a perfectibility that I can never bring to perfection”, Critchley 
argues, “drives the ethical activity of the subject.” (2007, 84 emphasis added). 
 
7 Discussion: humour and friendship 
Our consideration of Levinas and Critchley here is not intended to supplant or revise 
Laclau’s post-foundationalism but merely to inform a supplement to Laclau’s 
position. Laclau himself takes issue with the Levinasian presentation of ‘ethics as first 
philosophy’ – a scepticism which, as we have seen, is affirmed by Critchley. For 
Laclau, as for Derrida, the ethical has no extra-discursive basis from which to derive a 
normative orientation or benchmark for decision making. Levinas, in Laclau’s (2000, 
81)  words, “did not resist the temptation to give some sort of content to ethics”. For 
Laclau, the inescapable moment (of decision in a confrontation with undecidability) is 
not ‘just’ a matter of ethics, as Levinas contends, but is ethico-political. It is a 
“moment of madness” in which an investment is made in some normative order - with 
both ethical and political consequences – notwithstanding that “no normative order ... 
is, in and for itself, ethical” (Laclau, 2000, 81).  
 
As we have noted, Critchley focuses, with good reason, on the fact that this ethico-
political moment of madness is potentially infinitely demanding so that without some 
form of coping mechanism or ‘practice of minimal sublimation’, the subject risks 
dissolution into paralysis rather than being driven to ethical action. Critchley proposes 
self-deprecating levity as this sustaining practice but in the case of Ellsberg it is far 
from clear that it was self-deprecating levity which sustained him through crisis. 
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Ellsberg’s account of his whistleblowing includes little levity, even though a number 
of episodes are, arguably, quite comical and even farcical. Even if Wells’ biography is 
unduly derogatory about Ellsberg, it does highlight an earnest intensity about him 
evident in a tendency to take himself a little too seriously. Although Ellsberg is 
reported by many of Wells’ informants to have a well developed sense of humour (he 
even wrote a humour column for his school magazine: Wells, 2001, 66), by all 
accounts Ellsberg rarely directed that humour to himself,5 inclining instead to 
lampoon others. The freelance writer, Peter Schrag, who spent a good deal of time 
with Ellsberg, observes that “The first time I met him in 1971 he struck me as a 
person who was “too perfect, perhaps, too compulsively eager to be correct, too 
intense, too committed, too illiberal with himself.” He had, as one of his friends said, 
very little capacity for self-irony” (Schrag, 1974, 32).  
 
If, as it seems, it was not humour6 that enabled Ellsberg to address what Critchley 
terms the chronic overloading of the subject by an unfillable demand, might there be 
some other coping mechanism(s) at work here? Whereas Critchley focuses on the 
subject’s relation to his/her self, Laclau’s focus is less self-directed, and more  
attentive to the collective/social, understandings of the subject. Might Laclau’s 
thinking help identify other ways of sustaining the subject when enduring processes of 
subjective dissolution and reconstruction that accompany the madness of the 
decision? 
 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that this assessment is contested by his son. See 
http://myhero.com/go/hero.asp?hero=Daniel_Ellsberg. Accessed 20th February 2014. 
6 Critchley does not deny the possibility that means other than humour can sustain the chronically 
overloaded subject in the moment (or stream of moments) of the decision. But, perhaps because of the 
origination of his argument in a Levinasian view that invites a focus on the ethical/individual subject, 
he does not explore other, less ‘internalized’ possibilities 
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If we attend to the years before Ellsberg decided to leak the Papers, he went through a 
protracted process of transformation in which new orientations to ‘the other’ 
developed but also new friendships and relationships were formed. Ellsberg reflects 
on the process of dissolution and reconstruction in terms of exchanging a narrow 
loyalty to state (embodied in the President) and pursuit of career for a broader or 
higher loyalty to the lives of others (see Ellsberg, 2003, xiii-xiv) 
 
This language of loyalty, we contend, resonates more with interpersonal concepts of 
allegiance and also to friendship than more self-directed concepts of responsibility 
and self-deprecating humour. Friendship and direct interpersonal relationships, rather 
than self-deprecating humour, seem to have been more significant for Ellsberg. What 
enabled him to reach the decision to leak the Papers, and to deal with the 
consequences, we suggest, was, in substantial part, not humour but friendship. 
 
Ellsberg makes numerous references to the importance of friendship. Especially 
important was Tony Russo who worked with him at RAND, assisted him in copying 
the Papers, and so also faced imprisonment7. A pivotal moment, which signified to 
Ellsberg the importance of friendship, occurred at a talk by Randy Kehler, a 
prominent peace campaigner, given on August 28th 1969. Kehler’s speech was a 
catalyst for Ellsberg’s determination to risk prison in order to shorten the war: 
“[Kehler] mentioned his friends who were in prison and remarked that he 
would soon be joining them, it had taken me several moments to grasp what 
he had just said. Then it was as though an ax split my head, and my heart 
                                                 
7 D. Ellsberg, ‘Eulogy for Tony Russo’ available at http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/eulogy-for-tony-
russo. Accessed on 17 February 2014. Ellsberg himself faced twelve felony charges totalling a possible 
115 years in prison. 
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broke open. But what had really happened was that my life had split in two” 
(Ellsberg, 2003, 272) 
 
Hearing Kehler’s talk and, especially, the reference to his friends led Ellsberg to break 
down and retreat to the men’s room where he slid down onto the tile floor and, for the 
first time in his life, sobbed uncontrollably for an hour (see also Ellsberg, 2002). We 
understand by this that Ellsberg now fully faced the decision in all its undecidability. 
Or as he puts it, “What I had just heard from Randy had put the question in my mind, 
What could I do, what should I be doing to help end the war now that I was ready to 
go to prison for it?” (Ellsberg, 2002). Within a month, Ellsberg began to copy and 
then distribute the Papers. 
 
It had taken the care and encouragement of Ellsberg’s friends to ready him for this 
decision, and it would take further support from his friends (including his second wife 
Patricia Marx, mentioned earlier, who he had recently married) to act on as ‘mad’ and 
uncertain a decision - rife with further trauma and the loss of old subjectivity - as to 
leak the Papers. Care for the fragility of his position and his self was found, in 
Ellsberg’s account, less in internally generated humour than in trusting himself to the 
protection of his friends – trusting that their love and loyalty-as-care would carry him 
through, and throughout, the dislocatory trauma of his treasonable act and its 
consequences, supporting him as he found and formed a new subjectivity and 
associated set of identifications (e.g., as a political activist). Growing confidence that 
his friends would be there for him enabled Ellsberg to take the momentous decision to 
leak the Papers – something that he had been contemplating, but also repeatedly 
postponing, for years.  
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The importance of loyalty and of how his ‘madness’ would be understood by others is 
also evident in Ellsberg’s account of why he invited his children (13 and 10) to 
accompany him to the print shop where copied the Papers. Anticipating how his 
leaking of the Papers would be reported by the media, and would not be challenged or 
counteracted by his estranged wife with whom his children lived, Ellsberg writes: 
“They would read right away, and hear on television, that their father was a 
traitor. That I had gone mad, done something bizarre. I wanted them to have a 
memory that they could hold on to that would counter those stories. If they 
could spend an evening with me while we copied the papers, they could see 
that I wasn’t acting weird, wasn’t crazy. I was working with friends, in a 
matter-of-fact way…they would know that it might be necessary, it might be 
the right thing to do, in some circumstances to take an action that would send 
them to jail” (2003, 305 original emphasis)  
 
By a ‘friend’ we do not understand Ellsberg to mean close associates, people whom 
he had known for many years or someone who is uncritically supportive. Those 
understandings of friendship overlap with understandings of cronyism as “a 
derogatory sense of friendship with a trace of political corruption or preferential 
treatment about it”. (Khatri and Tsang, 2003, 290) Even in its least derogatory sense, 
this understanding of friendship often points to a relationship which mutually 
reinforces and supports friends’ established identities by glossing over limits and 
differences. Instead, by ‘friendship’ we refer here to the ‘other’ of, or alternative to, 
the glossing, preferential and unquestioning colleague or comrade. For us, the friend 
is someone “who makes you aware of where your limits lie. He or she directs your 
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attention towards the boundaries that enclose us, and thus towards possibilities of 
freedom” (Garlick, 2002, 570). This characterization seems particularly apposite for 
Ellsberg’s transformation during which, in effect, elements of an encrusted, 
unthinkingly patriotic self were challenged by his friends, and then progressively 
dissolved as he questioned, transgressed and erased the boundaries that maintained his 
silence as a keeper of secrets. In this regard, friendship contains a strongly 
transgressive power. While any friendship is threatened by betrayal (French et al., 
2009), it is not reducible to loyalty-as-allegiance where a preoccupation with 
preserving the boundaries of friendship exerts mutually suffocating effects.  
 
There is some resonance here with Grey and Sturdy’s (2007) almost singular 
discussion of friendship in which they note that, despite being a common experience 
when working in organizations, there is almost no literature on friendship in 
organizations. When analysis does touch on themes close to friendship – such as trust, 
support, coaching, goodwill, buddying – they tend to be instrumentalized. Instead of 
appreciating the value of friendship for decision makers, its significance is framed in 
terms of whether its manifestations and proxies are “functional or detrimental to 
organizational performance” (Grey and Sturdy, 2007, 163). The examination of 
friendship is thereby confined within a narrow, managerialist agenda. Marginalised, at 
best, is the importance of friendship as a lived, organizational phenomenon with, 
potentially, critical, emancipatory significance. In contrast, our examination of 
decision-making has moved beyond these confines to appreciate the central relevance 
of undecidability and the role of friendship in addressing its demands, as illustrated by 
Ellsberg’s decision to leak the Papers. While Ellsberg’s friendships were drawn 
mainly from outside the organizations for which he worked (e.g. RAND, Pentagon), 
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they are nonetheless of relevance for analysing his actions; and, more generally, they 
suggest that studies of the significance of friendship (e.g. for decision making) should 
not be confined to those formed within work organizations. 
 
8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have commended an approach that marks a departure from more 
established analyses of decision which are yoked to a narrow conception of 
performance. In their purview, politics and ethics are variously denigrated or 
commended for their contribution to more effective decision-making; and the 
presence of politics is invoked to explain deviations from rational outcomes. With 
regard to ethics, much analysis of decision-making in which reference is made to 
ethics presumes or proposes the existence of a particular normative framework against 
which the ethics of a decision can be assessed. In contrast, the approach commended 
here contends that “only that aspect of a decision which is not predetermined by an 
existing normative framework is, properly speaking, ethical” (Laclau, 2000, 82). The 
existence or influence of normative frameworks is not denied; but there is an 
insistence that undecidability precedes such frameworks and cannot be eliminated by 
them. Complying with a normative framework may provide welcome relief from 
‘moral doubt’ but it is precisely undecidability that is “the condition of possibility of 
ethically responsible decision making” (Clegg et al., 2007, 404). 
 
Our commendation of a post-foundational orientation, drawing predominantly on the 
insights of Laclau, anticipates the formation of an ethical decision maker who accepts 
the political necessity of assessing what is good and right while acknowledging and 
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defending what is recognised to be, inescapably, the contingency and mutability of 
every normative standpoint. Such a decision maker confronts the hubris of his or her 
own politicisation and subjectivity not as a means of dissolving or denying identity 
but, rather, as a way of sustaining a sense of identity in the face of its incipient 
dissolution. It is almost as if, in recognition of the arrogance and naivety of imagining 
that we matter, or that we can make a difference, the challenge is to find a way of 
renewing and reenergising the perennial struggle with undecidability. Self-
deprecating humour, in the form of “laugh[ing] at oneself, from finding oneself 
ridiculous” (Critchley, 2007, 83) is a potent means of renewal and revitalization, but it 
is not singular or exhaustive. We have suggested that friendship may offer another, 
more other-directed way of sustaining people through the madness of the decision. 
Whatever additional ways there may be, we conclude by recalling and adapting the 
relevance of Gramsci’s exhortation about the intellect and the will.  In the face of 
pessimism of the intellect but also of the perceived imminent dissolution of the self, 
post-foundationalism invites us, as ethical and political subjects, to find ways of 
rekindling and sustaining optimism of the spirit.  
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